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1. Introduction. 
 
It has frequently been suggested that firms in the large industrial groupings of Japan and 
Korea, known respectively as keiretsu and chaebol, may behave differently than their US or 
European counterparts in a number of dimensions.  A small set of papers in recent years have 
examined whether membership in such groupings affects firms’ foreign direct investment (FDI) 
decisions, with a particular focus on the effect of keiretsu groupings on Japanese FDI activity.   
The majority of papers on this topic have examined the effect of vertical keiretsu 
groupings, where upstream suppliers are centered around a large downstream manufacturer.  As 
detailed in Head, Ries, and Swenson (1995), significant agglomeration externalities are likely to 
be present for firms in vertical keiretsu groupings.  Suppliers work closely with downstream 
firms on designing specialized components and often provide just-in-time delivery of supplies.  
Thus, geographic proximity enhances the efficiency of such arrangements, giving firms 
incentives to locate their FDI in the same region.  Head, Ries and Swenson (HRS) empirically 
examine Japanese FDI in the U.S. and find that a greater existing stock of a Japanese firm’s own 
vertical keiretsu partners in a particular U.S. state makes that firm more likely to locate in that 
state as well.  However, they find that this vertical keiretsu effect is largely due to the automobile 
sector, and is no longer present when observations from this sector are excluded from their 
sample.1 
The other major form of industrial grouping in Japan is the horizontal keiretsu.  These are 
groupings of firms in often-unrelated industries that are centered on a large bank.  There are 
three features of horizontal keiretsu that observers have pointed out may be important for 
                                                          
1 Belderbos and Carree (2002) perform a similar analysis to HRS, but do so using data on FDI into China by 
Japanese firms.  As HRS found for Japanese automobile-related FDI into the U.S., Belderbos and Carree find 
significant positive effects of existing vertical keiretsu member presence on Japanese electronic firms’ location 
decisions in China, which is consistent with an agglomeration externalities motivation.  Other studies have found 
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economic behavior: 1) cross-ownership between partner firms, where a group bank holds a 
significant share of the group-member firms’ equity, and these member firms hold substantial 
equity positions in each other; 2) potentially easier terms of credit for members from the 
keiretsu-affiliated bank, both due to a reduction in the costs of monitoring and the discipline of 
repeat financing; 3) organized meetings amongst major keiretsu firms often called Presidential 
Council meetings which potentially facilitate the exchange of information and the coordination 
of actions. 
With respect to FDI activity, researchers have focused on easier credit terms as the 
feature of horizontal keiretsu that potentially leads to greater firm investment, including FDI.   
The tests employed examine whether membership in any horizontal keiretsu increases a firm’s 
likelihood of FDI, since such membership should give the firm cheaper financing of such 
investment, ceteris paribus.2  The evidence for these effects of horizontal keiretsu membership is 
much more mixed than for vertical keiretsu.3 
In addition to mixed empirical results, a recent paper by Miwa and Ramseyer (2002) 
argues that economic effects stemming from the features of horizontal keiretsu described above 
are more myth than reality.  They point out that the vast majority of financing by Japanese firms 
in keiretsu groupings comes from non-keiretsu financial institutions, and this share has been 
increasing over time.  This runs counter to the notion that horizontal keiretsu firms rely on their 
keiretsu bank for easier credit terms and may explain why previous studies have only found 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
positive effects of vertical keiretsu groupings on Japanese FDI activity using alternative estimation strategies, 
including Belderbos and Sleuwaegen (1996), Yui and Pugel (1995), and Ryan (2001). 
2 A horizontal keiretsu membership dummy is sometimes interacted with variables that measure how credit-
constrained the firm may be, to see if membership is more beneficial for such firms in the keiretsu. 
3 Belderbos and Sleuwegen (1996) find that horizontal keiretsu membership makes Japanese firms more likely to be 
multinational enterprises and that this membership effect is most significant for those firms that are credit 
constrained.  Ryan (2001), however, finds only weak evidence for a horizontal keiretsu membership effect, whereas 
McKenzie finds no evidence that such membership affects the likelihood of FDI into various regions by Japanese 
firms. 
 3
mixed evidence that horizontal keiretsu membership increases (foreign) investment.4  Likewise, 
Miwa and Ramseyer show that cross-shareholding arrangements are much lower than one would 
expect, particularly between the non-financial members of these horizontal keiretsu.  Finally, 
Miwa and Ramseyer dispute the notion that the Presidential Council meetings by executives of 
the keiretsu’s main members have any influence on behavior by members whatsoever, 
contending that “scholars who stress their importance have yet to produce a lunch club decision 
that much mattered.” (p. 193) 
Of the arguments Miwa and Ramseyer (2002) make to show that horizontal keiretsu are 
fables, their argument against the effect of Presidential Council meetings is likely the weakest.  
Even if they are correct that important collusive agreements amongst firms are not forthcoming 
from such meetings5, there is likely a high level of the networking and information exchange that 
occurs when heads of member firms meet.  Such networking connections may have a very 
substantial role in economic decisions and behavior, as evidenced by recent papers documenting 
a strong and significant effect of networking connections on international trade flows.6 We find 
these papers compelling, and suggest they serve to answer the obvious response to Miwa and 
Ramseyer's (2002) criticism, which is to ask why such meetings take place if they serve no 
purpose.  
In this paper, we examine for the first time the potential effect of networking connections 
through keiretsu relationships on the FDI decisions made by Japanese firms.  We hypothesize 
that if network effects are present then previous FDI activity by a firm’s horizontal keiretsu 
                                                          
4 We do not find this argument persuasive. While the share of financing of keiretsu firms’ investments by their 
group-member-bank may be small and falling, what is important is the financing of marginal investments.  This may 
be precisely where the special relationship has greatest impact.  
5 Note that tacit collusive decisions are by their very nature difficult to observe.  Thus, it should not surprise us if 
there are few known examples of obvious lunch club decisions that had an impact. 
6 Such papers include Greif (1993), Gould (1994), Head and Ries (1998), Rauch (1999) and Rauch and Trinidade 
(2002).  Rauch (2001) provides an overview of the theoretical and empirical work in this area. 
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partners into particular foreign regions will make FDI by the firm into these same regions more 
likely, because this lowers the necessary costs of information acquisition.  Thus, our focus is on 
whether region-specific horizontal keiretsu activity affects a firm’s FDI location decisions. This 
contrasts with previous studies of FDI by horizontal keiretsu that has examined whether keiretsu 
membership per se affects a firm’s decision to engage in FDI at all.     
Similar to HRS, we estimate a Japanese firm’s FDI location decision using a conditional 
logit framework.  However, we introduce two important innovations.  First, we sample FDI 
location decisions by Japanese manufacturing firms in the late 1980s and early 1990s across all 
foreign regions of the world.  Second, our sample includes both vertical and horizontal keiretsu, 
this allows us to examine the potential networking effects of horizontal keiretsu, while 
controlling for agglomeration benefits that are a strong feature of vertical keiretsu linkages.   
We find that agglomeration externalities from vertical keiretsu are important 
considerations for Japanese investment location decisions worldwide.  The stock of investment 
in a region by a firm’s vertical keiretsu members increases the probability of the firm’s location 
in that region.  For example, our estimates suggest that the existence of investment by vertical 
keiretsu members of 500 employees or more in a region increases the firm’s probability of 
location in that region by over 50%.  The agglomeration impact of unrelated firm location by 
Japanese manufacturing firms in the same industry is also statistically significant, though less 
than half the magnitude of the vertical own-keiretsu effects.  These agglomeration results are 
consistent with HRS, but importantly generalize these results for Japanese location decisions 
worldwide, not just for regions in the U.S.  Additionally, our vertical keiretsu effects are robust 
to the exclusion of automobile-centered vertical keiretsu, which was not true for HRS. 
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We also explore and find supportive evidence for the idea that investment activity by 
related horizontal keiretsu members affects worldwide investment location decisions of Japanese 
firms.  We find that recent (previous-year) investment activity by horizontal keiretsu partners 
leads to a greater probability of location in the same region by a firm.7  For example, previous-
year investment activity of horizontal partners of at least 100 employees increases a firm’s 
likelihood of location in that region by almost 20%.  We attribute these effects to the networking 
and information sharing that occurs between members of horizontal keiretsu, as such information 
sharing can yield cost-savings to a newly-locating firm.  Consistent with this interpretation, we 
find such horizontal keiretsu effects are substantially larger for the Presidential Council firms in 
the most closely-knit horizontal keiretsu – precisely where one would expect such information 
sharing to be the greatest.  We further find that the horizontal keiretsu effects only occur with 
respect to recent investment activity, suggesting that information relevant for entry decisions 
depreciates with the age of the previous investments.  These results provide the first systematic 
evidence for the networking effect of business groups on FDI decisions of which we are aware.8  
By examining the effect of recent investment activity by horizontal keiretsu members across 
regions, we better identify this networking effect, in contrast to previous studies that examined 
only whether membership in a horizontal keiretsu per se affects investment decisions.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  The next section outlines our empirical 
methodology that starts with the framework of HRS and modifies it to allow for the effects of 
networking and information-sharing on FDI location decisions.  Section 3 describes our sample 
of investment decisions by Japanese manufacturing firms from 1985 through 1991 and 
                                                          
7 Previous year's investments presumably reveal the most up to date and thus useful information. 
8 Using empirical methods similar to Rauch and Trindade’s (2002) study of bilateral trade patterns, Tong (2001) 
finds evidence that greater ethnic Chinese networks increase FDI activity between countries.  In contrast, we are 
examining network effects that occur through more formal business groups. 
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construction of our agglomeration and networking/information variables.  Section 4 then presents 
out conditional logit estimates and sensitivity tests before a final section concludes. 
 
2. Empirical Methodology 
 We follow HRS in specifying a Japanese firm’s FDI location decision as one that can be 
modeled using a conditional logit specification.  Assuming production is Cobb-Douglas and that 
agglomeration externalities enter the production function in a multiplicative fashion similar to 
infrastructure and other inputs, then a firm’s profitability for producing in a particular region is a 
log-linear function of the agglomeration measures, infrastructure measures and factor prices.  
Thus, the profitability of region r for investor j may be represented as  
θr + αi ln Aij,r+ εj,r ,     (1) 
where Ai represents agglomeration externalities from source i, θr represents region-specific 
effects, and εj,r is an error term.  Region-specific effects are important as they control for a wide 
variety of potentially important characteristics of a region that are both difficult to measure 
precisely and are hard to observe, but none-the-less may make it more or less attractive to 
investors.  Such characteristics range from infrastructure and input prices to labor force 
characteristics and amenities of the natural environment.9 
  HRS examine four sources of potential regional agglomeration externalities (Ai) in their 
empirical analysis: 1) from U.S. domestic firms in the same 4-digit Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) industry (AUS) in the region, 2) from other Japanese firms in the same 
industry (AJ) in the region, 3) from Japanese firms who belong to the firm’s vertical keiretsu 
(AG) in the region, and 4) from agglomeration in states that border the region (AB).  In our 
                                                          
9 The investment decisions we examine will also span a number of years, so we initially assume that these region-
specific variables are time-invariant.  However, below we explore inclusion of region-year-specific effects. 
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analysis, we include variables to measure the second and third agglomeration externalities in 
similar fashion to HRS.  The first source of agglomeration (U.S. domestic industry presence in a 
U.S. region) is obviously not directly comparable because we are examining worldwide FDI 
activity of Japanese firms, not just the U.S. component.  An analogue to this first HRS 
agglomeration variable would be a proxy for domestic activity in the region/country for the same 
SIC industry.  However, it is impossible to obtain comparable data on such activity across 
regions of the world for detailed 4-digit SIC industries.  Since our data span just seven years, we 
initially assume that changes in such aggregate activity remain constant across regions and are 
then subsumed into the region effects, though we show that are estimates are robust to including 
region-year effects as well which obviously relaxes this assumption.  Examination of the fourth 
source of agglomeration externalities (effects from border states) is not a significant issue for our 
analysis because we examine Japanese investment into much more aggregate country/region 
groupings than HRS.  Thus, we do not include such measures in our analysis.   
 Unlike HRS, our analysis examines not only agglomeration effects from vertical keiretsu 
relationships, but also the potential for networking effects associated with horizontal keiretsu.  
We hypothesize that networking connections with firms already in a particular region provide 
important investment information to an investing firm. This information can lower its costs of 
production in that particular region.  For example, such information could allow the firm to 
better site its investment in a more cost-effective location and/or garner more favorable tax and 
regulatory treatment.10    
                                                          
10 These are examples of how such information can lead to reductions in variable costs, since it is a production 
function that is the theoretical framework for the conditional logit specification we employ.  Networking and 
information costs may also lower one-time fixed costs of FDI location as well.  Our estimates may be capturing 
these one-time savings though we do not model them formally. 
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Another source of cost-reducing information not explored by HRS is the firm’s own 
experience.   Shaver, Mitchell, and Yeung (1997) find that FDI by firms into a region for which 
they have prior FDI experience is more likely to survive than FDI by first-time entrants.11  They 
attribute these effects to informational spillovers that occur within the firm.  Such within-firm 
informational spillovers should reduce the cost of operation in regions where a firm has prior 
experience and make such a location more attractive than others, ceteris paribus.  
Given these considerations, we can modify equation (1) to include these two sources of 
networking/information spillovers, membership of a horizontal keiretsu and the firm’s own 
experience: 
                         θr + αi ln AJj,r+ ηi ln AGj,r +  βi ln HKj,r + θi ln PEj,r +  εj,r ,       (2) 
where HK is a variable capturing the potential for information sharing through horizontal 
keiretsu relationships with other firms in region r, and PE is a variable measuring the firm’s own 
previous experience in region r, which can provide evidence on intra-firm information sharing. 
One potential difference between agglomeration effects from vertical keiretsu 
relationships and networking information effects from horizontal keiretsu groupings is that while 
agglomeration effects clearly relate to stocks of related firms, information effects may be more 
directly tied to recent flows of investment into a region, not stocks.  Firms that have most 
recently invested in a region should have better current information for potential investors.  As a 
result, we will examine both stock and recent flow measures of agglomeration and information-
sharing variables in our empirical analyses. Our maintained hypothesis is that stock measures 
best capture agglomeration effects, and flow measures best capture information-sharing effects. 
                                                          
11 In a related vein, Yu (1990), Kogut and Chang (1991), Hennart and Park (1994), Belderbos (1997), and Blonigen 
(2002) are examples of papers that have found that firms are more likely to invest abroad if they have previous FDI 
experience.  
 9
Of course, there may be agglomeration externalities that stem from what we are terming 
information variables.  For example, agglomeration externalities may exist between horizontal 
keiretsu firms, even though these horizontal keiretsu firms are almost always in different 
industries and, likewise, agglomeration externalities may stem from a firm’s own previously-
established plants in a region.   However, we expect agglomeration effects from these sources to 
be relatively minimal and outweighed by the informational effects.  Similarly, some information 
effects may stem from what we are terming agglomeration variables.  As our analysis below will 
show, these effects sort out well when comparing flow versus stock measures of our 
agglomeration and information variables. 
 
3. Data and Variable Construction 
We use the publication, Japanese Overseas Investment: A Complete Listing by Firms and 
Countries 1992/93 (English version) published by Toyo Keizai Inc., for data on Japanese FDI 
and foreign affiliate activity.12  This publication reports information from a census of all 
Japanese-owned subsidiaries, and includes location, parent firm, establishment date, 
employment, and type of investment (greenfield or acquisition). These data are updated and 
published semiannually, however, with the exception of the 1984 report, no other years provide 
an English version.  The 1992/93 census comes at the end of a substantial wave of FDI activity 
by Japanese firms in general, which began in the mid-1980s and subsided in the early 1990s.13  
We analyze FDI location decisions by all Japanese manufacturing firms for the period 1985 
through 1991, the last full year of the census information.   
                                                          
12 We gratefully thank Keith Head and John Ries at the University of British Columbia for sharing their electronic 
version of these data. 
13 Over half of the total Japanese affiliates reported in Toyo Kezei (1993) were established during the 1985-1991 
period. 
 10
We categorize investment locations into eleven countries/regions that comprise all 
possible world locations: the nine major destination host countries, an all-other developed 
country region, and an all-other less-developed country region.  The nine major destination 
countries are Germany, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Taiwan, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States.  With 1485 investment decisions in our sample from 1985 
through 1991 across 11 possible destinations, our data consist of a total of 16,335 observations. 
Table 1 reports the relative frequency of Japanese FDI established in the eleven locations.  
As can be seen from Table 1, the United States is the destination that receives the most Japanese 
FDI, accounting for 29.5% of total affiliates and 37.1% of foreign-affiliate employment.  Despite 
this, Japanese FDI is dispersed fairly widely across various destinations, with many top 
destinations in Southeast Asia. 
To proxy for agglomeration effects, HRS uses counts of establishments/plants.  One 
concern with counts is that it assumes comparable size of such establishment/plants.  As Table 1 
shows, average plant size in terms of employees can be quite different even at the aggregate 
country level, with a low of 187.4 employees per affiliate in Singapore to a high of 434.5 
employees per affiliate in Germany.  Given that the size of the affiliate likely affects the 
expected agglomeration and information effects from such an affiliate, we use the number of 
employees to proxy for agglomeration and information effects rather than counts of 
establishments/plants.  Thus, the number of employees by firms in the same 4-digit SIC industry 
in the region r (excluding the firm itself) proxies for AJj,r and the number of employees by 
members of the firm’s same vertical keiretsu in region r (again excluding the firm itself) proxies 
for AGj,r.  Similarly for the information-related variables, the number of employees by members 
of the firm’s same horizontal keiretsu (excluding the firm itself and any firms in the same 
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industry) in region r proxy for HKj,r, and the number of employees by the firm itself in region r 
proxy for PEj,r.  As in HRS, we add one to these employment measures of agglomeration and/or 
information to avoid taking the log of zero.   
HRS measures agglomeration variables as stocks, adding up the number of affiliates from 
all previous years.  As mentioned above, this seems most appropriate for agglomeration 
variables, but is perhaps less appropriate for information variables, as the quality of information 
may depend on recent experiences.  Thus, we consider measures that include only the previous-
year activity (flows) and ones that measure the stock of activity,14 expecting that the evidence for 
the information variables is stronger when considering flow measures and vice versa for the 
agglomeration variables.    
One measurement problem we face, regardless of whether counts of establishments or 
employees are used, is that we have these counts as of 1991-92 only, the year of the survey.  
Thus, when we include observations prior to these years, we are assuming both no exits between 
those years and the end of the sample, and, constant employee levels.  Head and Ries (2002) 
made the same assumptions in using this database to examine skill upgrading by Japanese firms 
when investing abroad.  Having our sample consider FDI activity only as far back as 1985 
mitigates this problem to some extent, especially when using previous-year flow data for our 
regressors.  In fact, we get qualitatively similar coefficient estimates to those reported below 
when we restrict our sample to just 1990 and 1991, the two most recent years of our sample, 
although the loss of observations inflates standard errors somewhat.  The use of stock data for 
our measures is more problematic as it necessarily assumes no exit or changes in employee 
levels for Japanese manufacturing affiliates have ever taken place.  Of course, the vast majority 
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of Japanese FDI occurred in the 1980s and 1990s (over 50% during the years of our sample, 
1985-1991) which helps in making the 1992 numbers a reasonable approximation for most of the 
sample.  With stock variables, counts of establishments may have an advantage in that exits of 
Japanese affiliates are a rare event, while changes in employee levels may be more common.  
Our results with stock variables are robust to whether one uses counts of establishments or 
number of employee measures.  Employee measures, however, always outperform counts-of-
establishment measures in terms of the attained log likelihood and goodness of fit measures.  
Thus, our specifications below use employee measures. 
We use Industrial Groupings in Japan 1988/89, published by Dodwell Marketing 
Consultants to categorize Japanese firms into keiretsu.  There are six main horizontal keiretsu 
(DKB, Fuyo, Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sanwa, and Sumitomo) with two lesser horizontal keiretsu (IBJ 
and Tokai).  There are a number of vertical keiretsu, largely centered around major electronics 
and automobile firms, including Hitachi, Matsushita, Nissan, and Toyota.  For horizontal 
keiretsu, the publication also lists which firms are Presidential Council members.  This will allow 
us to examine in our analysis below whether the horizontal keiretsu effects on investment are 
larger for these firms, as one would expect if the networking information hypothesis is correct.  
Table 2 displays summary statistics for our regressors. 
 
4. Results 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 present our conditional logit maximum likelihood estimates 
for Japanese manufacturing FDI when we use the previous year’s investment flow and total FDI 
stocks, to measure our agglomeration and information variables respectively.   The first two rows 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
14 We also tried measures that examined the most recent 5-year activity, which predictably gave coefficient 
estimates that were somewhere between the one-year flow and stock measures.  We do not report these for the sake 
of brevity. 
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report coefficient estimates for the agglomeration measures, previous investment by vertical 
keiretsu members and previous investment by Japanese firms in the same industry.  The second 
two rows report coefficient estimates for the networking/information variables, previous 
investment by horizontal keiretsu members and previous investment by the firm.  Region 
dummies are included in both equations and a chi-squared test strongly supports their inclusion.   
Comparing the specification with one-year flow measures (column 1) versus stock 
measures (column 2) provide differences in coefficients as hypothesized.  The strongest evidence 
for the information variables are in the one-year flow specification, while the agglomeration 
variables are strongest when stock data are used.  The previous-year flow of investment by 
horizontal keiretsu members affects current year location decisions in a statistically significant 
manner, providing the strongest evidence to date that networking effects influence FDI behavior.  
As one would expect, the effect of the firm’s own recent investment experience is even stronger, 
with a coefficient that is roughly double the magnitude of the horizontal keiretsu effect.  In the 
stock specification in column 2, the coefficient on both of these variables falls and the effect of 
horizontal keiretsu investment stock is not statistically significant. 
The results for the agglomeration variables are symmetrically opposite.  Both variables 
come in strongly when measured in stocks, as in HRS.  Also consistent with HRS, we find that 
the agglomeration effect from vertical keiretsu member investment is stronger than the 
agglomeration effect from investment by other Japanese firms in the same industry.  In this way, 
our results generalize HRS’ conclusions about the effect of agglomeration effects on Japanese 
FDI location to a sample that considers Japanese FDI to all world locations, not just regions in 
the United States.  Interestingly, our vertical keiretsu effects are robust to excluding the 
automobile-centered keiretsu, with the coefficient in column 2 changing from 0.119 to 0.113 and 
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remaining statistically significant at the 99% confidence level.  This was not true with HRS’ 
analysis of location in U.S. regions, where vertical keiretsu effects were much smaller and 
statistically insignificant when excluding auto-related investments. 
While we can tell from the coefficient estimates that the marginal effects of the 
information variables are in the same range as the agglomeration variables, it is not 
straightforward to interpret the magnitude of coefficient estimates in a conditional logit model.  
However, as shown in HRS, it can be shown that the average probability elasticity (over all 
choosers and location choices) for a given regressor can be expressed as the ratio, S-1/S, 
multiplied by the regressor’s associated coefficient, where S is the number of location choices.  
Since there are eleven location choices in our specification, the elasticity of the probability of a 
location being chosen with respect to a regressor is the regressor’s associated coefficient 
multiplied by 0.91.  At first glance this makes the elasticities associated with the coefficient 
estimates seem quite small, and, indeed, they are significantly smaller than those reported by 
HRS.  However, our use of employment data rather than counts of affiliates means that our 
regressors have significant variation as seen in Table 2.  For example, a standard deviation 
increase in the horizontal keiretsu investment regressor (using one-year flow data) represents an 
increase of 256% of the sample’s mean value of this regressor.   In fact, for all but one regressor 
(investment stock of other firms in the industry) the standard deviation is at least 100% of the 
mean.  This suggests that thinking about the marginal effects for a doubling (100%) increase in a 
variable is a reasonable metric for evaluating the economic significance of these variables on 
Japanese manufacturing location decisions.  By this metric, the estimated coefficients suggest 
small, though not inconsequential impacts.  For example, a doubling of previous-year investment 
by horizontal keiretsu members in an average region increases the probability of FDI location 
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there by 3.1%.  Similarly, there is a 6.9% increase in location probability for a doubling of 
previous-year investment in the region by the firm itself.  One potential reason for fairly small 
elasticities is that there are a large number of observations with little or no previous investment 
and a smaller number of observations where investment is relatively large.  Thus, interpreting 
estimated elasticities as relating to a regressor distribution that is relatively continuous may be 
misleading. 
An alternative is to specify our regressors in a more dichotomous fashion.  Another 
reason to explore such a specification is that agglomeration or information effects may be 
relatively inconsequential unless there is some minimum level of investment.  In columns 3 and 
4 of Table 3 we specify our agglomeration and information variables as binary variables that take 
the value of “1” if the previous investment (flow or stock) in a regions was greater than a certain 
threshold and “0” if not.  For previous-year flow measures in column 3, the threshold we use is 
100 employees, whereas for investment stock measures in column 4, the threshold is 500 
employees.  The pattern of coefficient signs and significance in columns 3 and 4 are almost 
identical to those in columns 1 and 2.  A number of alternative threshold levels for both the flow 
and stock measure were tried and yielded qualitatively similar results.15  Thus, our results are 
robust to this alternative specification.    
However, the marginal effects are easily interpretable in this binary specification as the 
change in the probability of location in a region when the threshold investment level occurs.  For 
example, if the previous-year investment flow into a particular region by a firm’s horizontal 
keiretsu members was greater than 100 employees, the probability of location in that region by 
the firm goes up 19.2%.  Previous-year investment greater than 100 employees by the firm itself 
                                                          
15  These alternative thresholds were 0, 50, and 250 employees for the flow measure, and 0, 250 and 1000 employees 
for the stock measure. 
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raises the location probability 43.5%.  Thus, the magnitudes of the marginal effects from this 
specification show that both the networking/information and agglomeration effects are 
economically quite significant. 
We interpret the positive coefficient on the horizontal keiretsu investment measure (one-
year flows) as evidence for information externalities due to networking connections.  However, 
some horizontal keiretsu are considered to be more tightly organized than others, and, 
additionally, firms within horizontal keiretsu may vary in how closely connected they are with 
other firms in the group.  Thus, we expect that networking/information effects are larger the 
more closely organized the horizontal keiretsu and the more closely connected the firm is to its 
horizontal keiretsu.  Dodwell Marketing Consultants (1990) indicates that of the eight horizontal 
keiretsu, the Mitsubishi, Mitsui, and Sumitomo keiretsu are most closely connected (e.g., see 
discussion on pp. 44, 58 and 73).  The other keiretsu were largely formed as more loosely-
connected groups after WWII.16  Additionally, Dodwell lists the firms that participate in the 
Presidential Council meetings, generally the largest and most influential companies in the 
group.17  This information allows us to examine whether the networking/information effects are 
larger for such firms and keiretsu.  We do this by adding a term that interacts our horizontal 
keiretsu measure with a binary variable that takes the value of “1” when the firm is a Presidential 
Council member in one of the three “cohesive” horizontal keiretsu listed above. 
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 4 provides results when we add this new interaction term to 
our base specification in columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.  As expected, the coefficient on this 
                                                          
16  In contrast, the Mitsubishi, Mitsui, and Sumitomo keiretsu are companies that were formerly organized as 
zaibatsu before WWII.  These zaibatsu were powerful family enterprises that rose to prominence in Japan after the 
Meiji restoration in 1868.  These zaibatsu were formally dismantled in the Allied occupation after WWII, but were 
allowed to reorganize as keiretsu in the 1950s. 
17  As of 1988/89, the Mitsubishi Presidential Council was comprised of 29 of the keiretsu’s 160 firms, the Mitsui 
Presidential Council was the top 24 of 120 firms and the Sumitomo Presidential Council was the top 20 of its 130 
firms. (Dodwell Marketing Consultants, 1990) 
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interaction term is positive and statistically significant in the one-year flow specification, with 
the coefficient indicating the extra networking/information effect that is enjoyed by these 
Presidential Council firms in these cohesive keiretsu groupings.  The separate horizontal keiretsu 
coefficient is now reduced and statistically insignificant, suggesting that the networking effects 
found in Table 3 are generally driven by this subset of firms.  As before, when we use stock data 
for our measures, the coefficient on both horizontal keiretsu terms falls and the interaction term 
is no longer statistically significant.  We interpret this as further evidence that a networking 
interpretation is appropriate for explaining the positive coefficient on the horizontal keiretsu 
investment measures.   
One potential source of omitted variable bias is the effect of macroeconomic events, such 
as exchange rate movements and economic growth in the potential host country, which may 
affect the desirability of locations.  A general way to control for this is to employ region-year 
specific constants rather than just region specific constants.  This would also control for 
systematic location of non-Japanese investment to the region, something that we have not 
controlled for to this point and which could also be a source of agglomeration (or information) 
externalities.  Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 provide results when we add region-year specific 
constants to our specification estimated in columns 1 and 2 of Table 4.  Our estimates are 
essentially unchanged from specifying region-year versus region specific constants. 
A final issue with any conditional logit estimates is the appropriateness of the assumption 
of the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA).  The common way to evaluate this is to 
statistically test whether coefficient estimates are relatively unchanged when various subsets of 
choices are excluded.  For our sample, one obvious concern would be whether the parameters 
affecting location decisions are the same between the less-developed country (LDC) locations 
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and developed country locations.  However, Hausman tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of 
identical coefficients between an LDC sample and the full sample, affirming the IIA assumption.   
Another obvious concern is the U.S. as a destination choice, as it easily represents the most 
frequent location choice for Japanese manufacturing during the sample years.  A Hausman test 
does not support the IIA assumption when one drops the U.S. as a location choice.  However, 
separate tests on a coefficient by coefficient basis, finds no significant difference in the vertical 
and horizontal keiretsu variables, the focus of our study, when comparing a specification that 
excludes the U.S. to the full specification.  Instead, the information effect of the firm’s own 
experience and the industry-level agglomeration effects are almost twice as large for a 
specification excluding the U.S. as a choice. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper finds evidence that Japanese business groups (keiretsu) provide networking 
and information externalities that affect the FDI location decisions of partner firms.  Previous 
work on Japanese business groups and FDI decisions has focused on vertical keiretsu, showing 
that location of FDI by a firm in a particular region is positively correlated with the existing FDI 
in that region by members of the firm’s vertical keiretsu.  The results from these studies provide 
evidence of agglomeration externalities.  We extend this literature to examine more closely the 
effect of horizontal keiretsu, large firms in primarily unrelated fields that are tied to a major bank 
and whose leaders systematically meet in Presidential Council or “lunch club” meetings.  Such 
meetings provide opportunities for information-sharing and networking, which can affect these 
firms’ economic activity, including their foreign investment decisions.  In particular, such 
information-sharing may allow a firm to better navigate a foreign country’s tax/regulatory 
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environment and better site its plant, lowering initial setup costs, as well as operating costs.  This 
would then make the firm’s location in the region more likely.    
Using a sample of all Japanese manufacturing investments from 1985 through 1991, we 
find evidence that recent FDI activity in a region by a firm’s horizontal keiretsu members 
increases the probability of location in that region by the firm, even after controlling for other 
factors including sources of agglomeration externalities.  As one would expect, this effect is 
much stronger for horizontal keiretsu firms that regularly participate in the Presidential Council 
meetings in the most closely-knit horizontal keiretsu groups.  A by-product of our analysis is that 
we confirm agglomeration externalities of vertical keiretsu relationships found by previous 
studies, but for a choice set that encompasses locations across the world, not just within a 
particular country, such as the United States or China.
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Table 1: Japanese industrial and electrical machinery investments from  
1985 through 1991, by location. 
 
Number of affiliates Affiliate Employees  
Country  
Number 
Percent of 
Total 
 
Number 
Percent of 
Total 
 
Average Plant 
Size (in 
employees) 
 
Germany 
 
47 
 
3.2 
 
20,421 
 
4.3 
 
434.5 
Indonesia 49 3.3 17,829 3.7 363.9 
Korea 73 4.9 14,756 3.1 202.1 
Malaysia 114 7.7 38,387 8.0 336.7 
Singapore 53 3.6 9,930 2.1 187.4 
Thailand 171 11.5 49,753 10.4 291.0 
Taiwan 106 7.1 23,430 4.9 221.0 
United Kingdom 83 5.6 21,796 4.6 262.6 
United States 438 29.5 177,090 37.1 404.3 
 
Other Developed Countries 
 
162 
 
10.9 
 
38,119 
 
8.0 
 
235.3 
Other Less-Developed 
Countries 
 
189 
 
12.7 
 
66,115 
 
13.8 
 
349.8 
 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics of regressors. 
 
 
Variable 
 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
 
One-Year Flow Measures 
    
Investment by vertical keiretsu members 0.231 1.113 0.000 8.407 
Investment by Japanese firms in same 
industry 
1.456 2.412 0.000 8.628 
Investment by horizontal keiretsu 
members 
0.403 1.388 0.000 9.681 
Investment by firm. 2.316 2.765 0.000 9.683 
 
Stock Measures 
    
Investment by vertical keiretsu members 0.819 2.254 0.000 9.362 
Investment by Japanese firms in same 
industry 
3.624 3.826 0.000 10.121 
Investment by horizontal keiretsu 
members 
2.240 2.958 0.000 9.798 
Investment by firm. 6.346 2.542 0.000 10.514 
Notes:  All variables are measured in numbers of employees and logged after adding the value of 
“1”, to avoid taking the log of zero.  
Table 3: Conditional Logit Estimates of the Effect of Previous-Year Investment by Keiretsu 
Members on a Firm’s Location Choice. 
Previous Investments 
Measured in Number of 
Employees 
Previous Investments 
Measured as Whether 
Large Investment or Not 
 
 
 
Regressors Previous-
Year Flows 
 
Stock  
Previous-
Year Flows  
 
Stock  
Agglomeration Variables     
Investment by vertical keiretsu 
members  
     0.001       
  (0.025)       
     0.119***    
  (0.033)       
  - 0.004        
  (0.158)       
    0.576***     
   (0.181)       
 
Investment by industry  
 
     
     0.036***    
   (0.013)    
     
    0.076***    
   (0.021)    
     
    0.192***     
   (0.070)    
  
    0.213***    
   (0.083)    
 
Information Variables 
    
Investment by horizontal keiretsu 
members  
    0.035**      
   0.016)        
     0.023       
  (0.035)       
    0.192**      
  (0.088)       
  - 0.127       
   (0.142)       
 
Investment by firm  
   
    0.076***    
   (0.018)   
 
    0.041***    
   (0.013)   
 
    0.435***     
   (0.116)   
 
    0.244**      
   (0.096)   
 
Region Dummies 
 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Log Likelihood - 3174.04 - 3168.56 - 3176.84 - 3178.02 
Chi-squared statistic     773.68***      784.62***      768.08***       765.71***  
Pseudo R2         0.11         0.11         0.11         0.11 
Number of observations      16335      16335      16335      16335 
NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses.  ***, ** and * denote statistical significance (two-tailed 
test) at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.  
 Table 4: Conditional Logit Estimates of the Effect of Stock of Investment by Keiretsu 
Members on a Firm’s Location Choice: Sensitivity Tests 
Differential Effects for 
Presidential Council 
Members in Most Cohesive 
Horizontal Keiretsu  
 
Replacing Region Dummies 
with Region-Year 
Dummies 
 
 
 
 
 
Regressors 
Previous-
Year Flows  
 
Stock  
Previous-
Year Flows 
 
Stock  
Agglomeration Variables      
Investment by vertical keiretsu 
members 
        0.001 
       (0.025) 
      0.119*** 
    (0.033)       
      0.000 
     (0.026) 
      0.117*** 
     (0.034)       
 
Investment by industry  
 
 
        0.036***    
       (0.013)    
 
      0.076***    
     (0.021)    
 
     0.022     
    (0.013)    
 
      0.074***    
     (0.021)    
 
Information Variables 
    
Investment by horizontal 
keiretsu members  
         0.019       
        (0.019)      
      0.013       
    (0.038)       
      0.006       
    (0.019)      
      0.005       
     (0.039)       
 
Investment by horizontal 
keiretsu members * Member  
of Presidential Council in 
cohesive keiretsu group 
 
         0.061*      
       (0.034)       
  
      0.054       
    (0.078)       
 
      0.060*      
    (0.034)      
 
      0.051       
     (0.080)       
 
Investment by firm  
 
        0.075***     
       (0.018)   
 
      0.040***    
     (0.013)   
 
     0.078***     
    (0.018)   
 
      0.043***     
     (0.013)   
 
 
 
Region Dummies 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
No 
 
 
No 
Region-Year Dummies 
 
No No Yes Yes 
Log Likelihood - 3172.39   - 3168.32 - 3089.58 - 3081.12 
Chi-squared statistic        776.97***       785.12***     942.58***    959.51*** 
Pseudo R2       0.11      0.11    0.13    0.13 
Number of observations    16335   16335 16335        16335 
NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses.  ***, ** and * denote statistical significance (two-tailed 
test) at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.  
 
